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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEAN K. HICKMAN and : 
RICK K. HICKMAN, 
Petitioners-Appellants, 
v. Case No. 940109-CA 
TAMARA HOLDEN and 
FRED VAN DER VEUR, : 
Priority No. 3 
Respondents-Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a 
petition for post-conviction relief involving first degree 
felonies. The Utah Supreme Court initially had sole jurisdiction 
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (Supp. 
1993). However, jurisdiction was transferred to this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Petitioners filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition. The 
issues raised on appeal are: 
1. Is petitioners' claim of ineffectiveness for failure 
to pursue a direct appeal moot based upon the fact that petitioners 
received appellate review of the denial of their motion to withdraw 
their guilty pleas? 
2. Did the district court correctly determine that 
petitioners failed to demonstrate prejudice? 
3, Was the district court required to determine if 
counsel's performance was deficient? 
On appeal from the denial of a petition for post-
conviction relief, the appellate court "survey[s] the record in the 
light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and [it] will 
not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the 
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be 
granted.'" Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) 
(citations omitted). When the denial includes rulings on questions 
of law, the trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 
S.Ct. 431 (1994); Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 
1992); Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 308-09 (Utah App. 1992). 
However, the trial court's findings of fact will be disturbed only 
if clearly erroneous. Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518; State v. Tyler, 
850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993); Stewart, 830 P.2d at 309. Claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel present a mixed question of 
fact and law. Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes 
or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented are 
contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 18, 1985, petitioners pled guilty to 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony (R. 76-79; Addendum A). 
The trial court sentenced each petitioner to serve a term of five 
years to life at the Utah State Prison (R. 35 & 68; Addenda B & C) . 
Brooke Wells represented petitioner Dean Hickman and Manny Garcia 
represented petitioner Rick Hickman (id.) . On July 6, 1988, 
petitioners separately moved to withdraw their guilty pleas (R. 9-
19 & 39-59) . The trial court denied petitioners' motions (R. 36-38 
& 71-73). In August 1988, petitioners appealed, pro se, to the 
Utah Supreme Court (State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670 (Utah 1989); R. 
128-131; Addendum D)). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's ruling (id.). 
Petitioners filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
on April 10, 1992, claiming that their counsel were ineffective 
because: (1) counsel coerced them into pleading guilty by 
threatening them with additional charges and prison time, and by 
allowing Detective Don Bell to be present during confidential 
discussions; (2) counsel failed to file any discovery motions; (3) 
counsel falsified the plea affidavits in that the affidavits 
represented that petitioners took personal property from the 
victim; (4) Brooke Wells told petitioner Dean Hickman that she 
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would appear before the Board of Pardons and guaranteed that he 
would only spend five years in prison; and (5) counsel refused to 
appeal on petitioners' behalf (R. 2-8). 
After an evidentiary hearing on July 27 & 28, 1993, the 
district court denied the relief requested in the petition (R. 156-
159; Addendum E) . Andrea C. Alcabes represented petitioners during 
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing (id.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioners were originally charged with attempted first 
degree murder, aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, all 
first degree felonies, in case no. CR 84-1436 (Hickman, 779 P.2d at 
671; R. 128-131; Addendum D) . Petitioner Rick Hickman was also 
charged with a second degree felony burglary and an aggravated 
sexual assault, a first degree felony, in case no. 84 FS 2514 (R. 
28; Addendum B). Petitioner Rick Hickman was also charged with a 
West Valley City robbery and burglary (id.). Petitioner Rick 
Hickman also had a federal parole hold placed on him in connection 
with a robbery charge (Tr. at 26; R. 200) . Petitioner Dean Hickman 
was charged with other felony offenses in a West Valley City case 
(R. 62; Addendum C). Pursuant to plea negotiations, petitioners 
pled guilty to aggravated robbery (R. 76-79; Addendum A), and all 
remaining charges were dismissed. Additionally, the plea bargain 
provided that any charges the State was currently investigating 
regarding Dean Hickman would not be brought (R. 62-67; Addendum C) . 
Finally, the information with respect to each petitioner was 
amended to reflect a deadly weapon other than a firearm in order to 
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avoid a mandatory firearm enhancement (R. 29, R. 61-62; Addenda B 
& C) . On or about December 15, 1984, when petitioners appeared for 
the preliminary hearing, they met with counsel in a small room in 
the circuit court building to discuss the charges against them (R. 
157; Addendum E). 
Petitioners filed separate motions to withdraw their 
guilty pleas (R. 9-19, 39-59) . The trial court denied petitioners' 
motions and they appealed, claiming that there was no factual basis 
for their guilty pleas (Hickman, 779 P.2d at 671; R. 129; Addendum 
D). Additionally, petitioner Dean Hickman claimed that the trial 
court failed to ask him whether his plea was free from threats, 
promises, and inducements, as required by rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (id. at 672). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's rulings finding that there was sufficient factual 
basis for petitioners' guilty pleas and that petitioner Dean 
Hickman entered his guilty plea "free from threats or promises" 
(AdLJ -1 
Discovery 
In lieu of testifying at the evidentiary hearing, Brooke 
Wells, petitioner Dean Hickman's former attorney, gave her 
testimony at a deposition.2 Ms. Wells testified that she 
•^Petitioner Rick Hickman did not challenge the voluntariness 
of his guilty plea and, therefore, the Utah Supreme Court did not 
address it. 
2Ms. Wells had a trial scheduled on the dates of the 
evidentiary hearing. Rather than reschedule the hearing, the 
parties agreed to use Ms. Wells' deposition testimony. Both 
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represented Dean Hickman in 1984 and 1985 concerning the aggravated 
robbery charge to which he pled guilty, as well as on other charges 
(Depo. at 4; Addendum F) . Ms. Wells testified that by the date 
scheduled for petitioners' preliminary hearing, she had acquired 
all discovery materials and, since a plea bargain had been reached, 
she felt no need to file for additional discovery (Depo. at 7; 
Addendum F) . Additionally, the district court found that Ms. Wells 
advised both petitioners, at least in a conclusory manner, that 
there was substantial evidence against them (R. 157; Addendum E). 
At the evidentiary hearing, Manny Garcia testified that 
he represented petitioner Rick Hickman in 1985 concerning numerous 
robberies, burglaries, an attempted murder and an aggravated sex 
assault (Tr. at 25-26; R. 199-200). Petitioner Rick Hickman pled 
guilty to one count of aggravated robbery in exchange for dismissal 
of the other charges (Tr. at 26; R. 200) . Mr. Garcia testified 
that, although he had no specific memory regarding discovery, he 
automatically filed a request for discovery along with his 
appearance of counsel form in every case (Tr. at 28; R. 202). Mr. 
Garcia testified that he would most likely have had discovery 
materials by the time of the preliminary hearing (id.; Tr. at 30; 
R. 204) . Additionally, at the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, the district court stated that it could not remember a 
petitioners were present at the deposition, as was their attorney, 
Andrea Alcabes (Deposition ("Depo"); Addendum F). 
Although the original deposition is unexplainably missing from 
the district court's record, it was marked as an exhibit and 
offered into evidence at the evidentiary hearing (R. 145, 147, 194-
196) . 
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district court file involving the Legal Defender's Office where a 
request for discovery was not filed with a formal written 
appearance of counsel because it was LDA's routine practice to-do 
so (Tr. of Evid. Ruling at 2; Addendum G) . The district court 
further noted that the criminal charges had not reached the 
district court level at the time the plea bargain was reached 
(AdJ • 
Plea Negotiations 
During plea negotiations, Ms. Wells informed petitioner 
Dean Hickman that there were possibly other charges under 
investigation that might be brought unless he accepted the plea 
bargain (Depo. at 5; Addendum F) . However, Ms. Wells neither 
threatened nor coerced petitioner Dean Hickman into pleading guilty 
(Depo. at 4-5; Addendum F) . Ms. Wells advised petitioner Dean 
Hickman that it was in his best interest to plead guilty to the one 
count of aggravated robbery without a firearm enhancement because 
it would minimize the amount of time he would spend in prison, and 
because it was the lesser (in terms of stigma) of three very 
serious charges (Depo. at 5, 8; Addendum F). However, Ms. Wells 
never told petitioner Dean Hickman that he would spend a specific 
number of years in prison by either accepting or rejecting the plea 
agreement because the authority to determine the number of years an 
inmate spends in prison rests solely with the Utah Board of Pardons 
(Depo. at 5-6, 9; Addendum F). 
Mr. Garcia testified that he did not coerce petitioner 
Rick Hickman into accepting the plea bargain (Tr. at 26; R. 200). 
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Mr. Garcia informed petitioner Rick Hickman that additional 
burglary charges were going to be filed, but did not threaten 
petitioner with these additional charges (id.). Mr. Garcia 
testified that he did not tell petitioner Rick Hickman a certain 
number of years that petitioner would spend in prison (Tr. at 27; 
R. 201). Mr. Garcia had no knowledge of how much time petitioner 
Rick Hickman would spend in prison except based upon the charge 
which carried a sentence of 5-life (id.). 
Detective Don Bell 
Ms. Wells testified that Detective Don Bell was not 
present during any confidential attorney-client discussions (Depo. 
at 6; Addendum F). Detective Bell was present at the courthouse 
for the preliminary hearing which petitioners subsequently waived, 
but Ms. Wells does not recall Detective Bell ever being present 
during confidential discussions with petitioner Dean Hickman (id.). 
Mr. Garcia testified that Detective Bell was present 
during part of an attorney-client meeting with petitioners at the 
circuit court in order to provide more information regarding 
discovery, but that Detective Bell was not present during actual 
plea negotiations (Tr. at 27-28; R. 201-202) . Mr. Garcia testified 
that it would be totally improper for Detective Bell to sit in on 
confidential plea discussions (Tr. at 28; R. 202). 
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The district court found that Detective Bell was present 
during the latter portion of the meeting at the circuit court 
between petitioners and counsel (R. 157; Addendum E).3 
Detective Bell testified that his first contact with 
petitioners was in December 1984 at the jail several hours after 
they had been arrested (Tr. at 86-88; R. 260-262) . Detective Bell 
was accompanied by Detective Jerry Mendez (Tr. at 88, 93; R. 262, 
267) . Petitioners did not wish to speak to the detectives, -so the 
detectives left (id.) . Detective Bell next saw petitioners at the 
preliminary hearing in January 1985 (Tr. at 89; R. 263) . Detective 
Bell did not sit in on any plea negotiations between petitioners 
and their respective attorneys (id.). 
Appearance Before Board of Pardons 
Ms. Wells testified that she did tell petitioner Dean 
Hickman that she would appear with him before the Board of Pardons 
because it is her standard practice to offer that help to her 
clients (Depo. at 9; Addendum F) . However, Ms. Wells did not 
receive notice of a Board of Pardons hearing and, therefore, did 
not appear (id.). 
3This finding is not in conflict with Ms. Well's testimony. 
Ms. Wells testified only that Detective Bell was not present during 
actual confidential plea bargain discussions. Therefore, it is 
entirely possible for Detective Bell to have been present only to 
provide information regarding pending charges, as Mr. Garcia 
testified. The district court did not find that Detective Bell was 
present during confidential plea bargain discussions. 
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Direct Appeal 
Ms. Wells testified that petitioner Dean Hickman did not 
ask her to pursue a direct appeal on his behalf (Depo. at 9; 
Addendum F). Based upon this and the fact that appellate rights 
are essentially waived by pleading guilty, Ms. Wells did not file 
a direct appeal on petitioner Dean Hickman's behalf (id.). In June 
of 1988, Ms. Wells sent a letter to petitioner Dean Hickman 
regarding habeas corpus relief (id.). The Legal Defender contract 
prohibits LDA attorneys from representing clients beyond the first 
appeal of right (Depo. at 10; Addendum F) . In her 1988 letter, Ms. 
Wells explained this to petitioner and gave him the name of the 
firm that had the contract with the prison to handle post-
conviction matters (id. at Exhibit A; Addendum F). 
Mr. Garcia testified that he explained the waiver of 
appellate rights to petitioner Rick Hickman and that petitioner 
signed the plea affidavit indicating such (Tr. at 28-29; R. 202-
203) . Mr. Garcia did not recall petitioner Rick Hickman ever 
asking him to file a motion to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea 
(Tr. at 29; R. 203). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioners claim of ineffectiveness concerning counsel's 
failure to pursue a direct appeal is moot because petitioners 
received appellate review of the denial of their motions to 
withdraw their guilty pleas. Accordingly, this Court need not 
reach the merits of this issue. 
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The district court correctly determined that petitioners 
failed to establish that their counsel were ineffective. 
Petitioners failed to demonstrate that but for counsel's 
representation, they would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted upon going to trial. Additionally, petitioners failed to 
prove that had counsel filed formal discovery motions, they would 
have discovered exculpatory information prior to the time 
petitioners pled guilty. Accordingly, petitioners failed to 
satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
Finally, petitioners claim that the district court 
incorrectly refused to reach the merits of their claim that counsel 
coerced them into pleading guilty. This claim is part of 
petitioners' list of ineffectiveness allegations and, thus, is 
covered by the district court's ruling that petitioners failed to 
demonstrate prejudice. The district court did not make findings or 
conclusions regarding the deficient performance prong because it 
was not obligated to, having found a lack of prejudice. 
Nevertheless, the record is devoid of any coercion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONERS' CLAIM REGARDING COUNSEL'S FAILURE 
TO PURSUE A DIRECT APPEAL IS MOOT AND, 
THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS 
COURT 
Petitioners claim that their counsel were ineffective for 
failing to pursue a direct appeal. Even assuming that petitioners 
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were denied their right to a direct appeal, the appropriate relief 
would be to resentence petitioners so that they may pursue a direct 
appeal. See State v. Hallett. 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981); Bocrgess v. Morriss, 
635 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981). However, petitioners received 
appellate review of their guilty pleas on appeal from the denial of 
their motions to withdraw (Hickman, 779 P.2d 670; R. 128-131; 
Addendum D) . Since petitioners have already received direct review 
of their guilty pleas (and are currently receiving appellate review 
of their ineffectiveness allegations), their claim is moot. See 
Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981) (case moot if requested 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants); Spain v. 
Stewart, 639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981) (postconviction claim 
rendered moot if the relief requested has been granted). 
Accordingly, this Court should refuse to reach the merits of this 
issue. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
PETITIONERS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE AS 
REQUIRED BY STRICKLAND AND HILL 
In order to prevail on their claims of ineffective 
counsel, petitioners must demonstrate that: (1) specific acts or 
omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the proceeding. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). To 
satisfy the first of the two prongs, petitioner must demonstrate 
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that counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This requires a 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that they were not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment. 
Id. Accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
However, the court will not second-guess counsel's legitimate 
strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those choices might 
appear in retrospect. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Petitioners 
must therefore overcome the strong presumption that counsel's 
performance fell "within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." Id. See also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 
(Utah 1993); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert, denied, 
459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court clarified the requirements of the prejudice 
prong with respect to allegations of ineffective counsel during the 
plea process. The Court held that in order to satisfy the 
prejudice prong of Strickland, a petitioner "must show that there 
is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 
Id. at 59 (emphasis added). The purpose of requiring a 
demonstration of prejudice from petitioners who challenge the 
validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective counsel 
is to maintain the "fundamental interest in the finality of guilty 
pleas." IcL at 58. 
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The district court specifically concluded that 
petitioners failed to demonstrate that absent counsel's 
representation, they would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted upon going to trial (R. 158; Addendum E; Tr. of Evid. 
Ruling; Addendum G) . Accordingly, the district court properly 
ruled that petitioners failed to demonstrate prejudice under 
Strickland and Hill. 
Petitioners have failed to point to record evidence which 
contradicts the district court's conclusion. Both petitioners did 
testify that if they had been aware of the evidence against them 
(i.e. the identity of the State's witnesses), they would not have 
pled guilty (Tr. at 57, 81; R. 231, 255) . Nevertheless, the 
district court has the responsibility of ascertaining the 
credibility of the witnesses and apparently did not find 
petitioners' testimony credible, a determination fully within its 
province. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Sprouse v. Jacrer, 806 P.2d 219, 
222 (Utah App. 1991) ("We give great deference to the trial court's 
findings, especially when they are based on an evaluation of 
conflicting live testimony.") (citation omitted). 
Petitioners testified only that discovery information 
would have influenced their decisions to plead guilty (Tr. at 57, 
81; R. 231, 235) . Petitioners' claims failed because: (1) the 
district court did not accept their statements as credible, in 
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light of the totality of the circumstances;4 and (2) petitioners 
failed to demonstrate that formal discovery would have produced 
any exculpatory information. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 
526 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994) (to prove prejudice 
regarding a claim of ineffectiveness for failure to file a formal 
discovery motion, petitioner must show that filing a formal motion 
would have yielded exculpatory information); Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P. 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) ("proof of ineffective assistance of 
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable 
reality."). 
Petitioners have not demonstrated that formal discovery 
would have produced any exculpatory information. Petitioners have 
asserted only that they would not have pled guilty had they known 
who the State's witnesses would have been. Petitioners knowingly 
and voluntarily entered their pleas and were competently 
represented in the process. Furthermore, neither petitioner 
testified that they would not have pled guilty absent counsel's 
4Given the numerous serious charges petitioners faced that 
were dismissed as part of the plea bargain, it is unlikely that 
they would have insisted upon going to trial on three (3) first 
degree felonies and subjected themselves to other charges that 
would have been filed, regardless of counsel's actions or 
inactions. 
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other alleged deficiencies.5 Therefore, this Court should affirm 
the district court's ruling. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS 
DEFICIENT 
Petitioners claim that the district court erred by 
failing to consider their allegation that counsel coerced them into 
pleading guilty. The district court received testimony regarding 
the alleged coercion (because it was part of the laundry list of 
ineffectiveness claims), but chose to deny petitioners' requested 
relief solely on the lack prejudice, without reaching the deficient 
performance issue. The district court was not required to address 
the deficient performance prong of Strickland since it found no 
prejudice. See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) 
(reviewing court "need not determine whether counsel's performance 
was deficient if defendant fails to satisfy his burden of showing 
that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies."). 
Despite the foregoing, both counsel testified that they 
neither threatened nor coerced petitioners into pleading guilty. 
Petitioners each signed a plea affidavit and participated in a rule 
5In their brief, petitioners claim that they would not have 
pled guilty absent counsel allowing Detective Bell to attend 
confidential plea discussions. However, there is no testimony from 
petitioners that supports this claim. Petitioners testified that 
they would not have pled guilty only in response to Ms. Alcabes' 
question regarding knowledge of discovery information (Tr. at 57 & 
81; R. 231 & 255). 
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11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, colloquy with the trial court 
(Addenda B & C) . Petitioners claim they never read the plea 
affidavits and were coached by counsel throughout the plea 
colloquy. However, petitioners told the trial court that they had 
read and understood their respective plea affidavits and 
petitioners signed their plea affidavits in open court (R. 30-31, 
66-67; Addenda B & C) . The plea colloquy is devoid of any coaching 
by either defense counsel, and the trial court specifically- found 
that petitioners' pleas were voluntarily entered (R. 34, 68; 
Addenda B & C) . Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has 
previously ruled that petitioner Dean Hickman's guilty plea was 
free from threats or promises (Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672; R. 130; 
Addendum D) . Petitioners' allegations of coercion are simply 
unsupported by the record and, thus, their requested relief should 
be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondents respectfully 
request that this Court affirm the district court's denial of the 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
In accordance with this Court's procedure concerning oral 
argument and the issuance of opinions, effective January 1, 1995, 
Respondents-Appellees do not request oral argument. 
17 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of February, 1995 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
ANGELA K MICKLOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES was mailed, postage prepaid, this 
day of February, 1995 to: 
James L. Warlaumont 
APPEL Sc MATTSSON 
Attorneys for petitioners 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Plea Affidavits 
F I K D IN CLERK'S 0F.: 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial Distract Lako County u;< 
State of Utah 
JAM 10 1235 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff / H- 0l';'=n H/ttisy. C:$ 3ri C/t. 
> ,j „. /I , Affidavit of fawM r ^ . ( c 
>tM) Vaiu H-;C///;IMA) ^.-...K,- If i fan •" 
\ , j Defendant / 
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of 
(Name of Crime) 
E1Z""^7/4Y^WX/i/ fr*tA * Z . 0/V //// 
/ / ) 7f / -)r/ /vJfl-/ / \ / TOt>KL ^ M d ) f ,<^ qW• 
'1/J tdrtStSSibAJ Q/= Miur>7Hr* totTHujur (taL&fjJT Bf US<r , 
I have received a copy of-jhe charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a 
e of Felony or Class ofNlisdemcanor) ^ ^ 
ime mav be g T v ^ ^ T b U P e . 
_ fine, or trciHi. Lam not on drug! oralcoho 
made. I am represented by Attorney fc^fr <-*z><3X^ —x~\ 
(Degre ^Njjsdemeano  
and understand the punishment for this cri  a 
prison term.. fine, fcfarfi. l. 
My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily .      V H ^ (^^><^X^m — H c \ 
who has explained my rights to me and 1 understand them. 
1. 1 know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. 1 know that if 1 wish to have a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my 
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to hz^t those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that 1 have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if! choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. 1 know that under the constitution that 1 have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that i have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty i am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
proceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered. 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I havebeeri 
convicted or to which 1 have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 
G007G 
&. I Know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty docs not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine 
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges 
ing against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)): pendi g agai st e, to- it^ ( o rt case er(s) or co t(s)): 
will be drsmissecfand warno oTScrcharge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which jfe ^fa/t.v 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made 
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by 
the Judge. 
10. ! have^ read this Affidavit, or i have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents.! 
am sT*Ls years of age, have attended school through fh* ' ^  and I can read and 
understand the English language. 
ive_read this Affidavit, or l have had it read to me by my attorney, and I Know 
_£2lLii years of age, have attended school through the « 
Dated this / £ dav of 
'tids*—Mi HtSJfirS?-
Defendant uetendant 
Subscribed and-sworn io before me in Court this z day of ..rj*> ^ ^
 tmmmmn tQ f*^ 
Q\j n^&i&JlL Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFEI^S^XTTrtJlWEY: . ) 1 , 
I certify that I am the attorney for vjStJ{T7V JLL/jTnt'defendant named above and I know he 
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him/and 1 discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true. 
Defense Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTINC ATTORNEY: 
tktoif/aiH HfUMBfi. I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against, 
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to 
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest. 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of-Guilty** to the charge, set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. . 
Done in Court this L J £ day of 'S.J ^AA.*,i .ft. , !9 *SV. 
• • . • , ^ --,- District Judge 
~i!_ou •C^it CC077 
Deputy Cter*' 
, Affidavit of Defendant * 
T H E S T A T E Of ; \H A H , 
Plaintiff 
Criminal ».. ^ - / 4 3 C 
i\Lic< % i J i c /^O 
Defendant 
. under oath, hereby acknowledge thai I have entered a plea ol 
guilty to the charge* r *<s) of: A ^7) 
Elements: 
(Name ot Crime) 
Facts 
LAJkJL 
^veaj-cw fry 
I have received a cop\ of lhe charge (Inlormationi .Hid understand ihe crime A am plcadim: guiltv ID IS a *< 
(Dcure: ol I •emnv or Class of Misdenrea: 
and understand the punishment for this crime mav be 
prison term. 7 /C\ POX) 
S?yjZjl~a 7 » <^vJs 
line, o&hoth. I am not on dpugs or alcohol 
V A,,.„n.rv/VjU-)^y (^AR-CiA M> plea ot guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by 
who has explained my rights to me and 1 understand them. 
1. ! know that 1 have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury tual upon the charge to which 1 
have entered a plea ot guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial ! have a light to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in m\ 
presence and before the Judge and iury .vith the right ;o have those witnesses cms* examined ru my attorney. lai»o 
know- that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testily in court upon my bchali and 
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury wii! be told thai this ma\ not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the ciime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it he iham! guilty or not guilty must he by a 
complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that 1 have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that 
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testily unless I choose 
to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if! were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah lor review ol the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not allord to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering n plea ol guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as >et out in the 
prccceding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty ol the ctime to which my plea ol guilty is enteied. 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another olfenscof which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. 
GCpurVS 
«»yHJWj^M . l l i l » • ! i 
• f ^ w w - t w ^ v d ^ ^ i w ^ ^ i ^ t i w f ^ r ^ 
• •# ^ c n i f f K c . l in.pfu.M.mr.u upon I M O M J #.., I ' I , , . . , , ^ , •..»<• r*<* « m.»Or i«. n.r *•% *•»%.. i»r «.n.. <*<».»i H.c ».< .,t ,4
 % r -% M l " " " *" 
he 
1 Na promises or threats of any kind have been made tn nduce me to pkM«! guilty 1 he JoUowing mh ;r chat ges^- * 
pending against me. to-wir (Court case Humberts) or eouMtts))-* 9*~-£* C2*c*s-SSl*J %> <***-$&?^ c *^£±^J2! j f^ > * 
wul he dismissed, and that no oilier? ha rgtfljfl uulbe fneci against me lor other crimes 1 may have commuted which <ix/r<^^ 
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am aUo aware that anv charge or sentencing concessions or 
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction ot the charges lot sentencing ma»Je 
or sought by cithcrdclcnbccitun.se! or counsel lor the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not hcapriovcd 1»'; 
the Judge. 
10 I have read this Affidavit, or 1 have had it read tome by my attorney, and I know and understand K*. contents J 
am J- *~ years ol age. ha\e attended school thiough 'he J L J L - . . ^ V ^ L - ^ L L -
uiuierstand the llnghsh language 
If 
~z?~ . and I can teau 
dav ol 
Subscribed a^tff wpn£to|KJTore me m C'ouit this. 
' ^ t 
'/ 
I >e lend ant 
_da\ id a ' W J U J . . I I > . ^ g"* 
SLMI 
<£l±_^.SJULCXLU . .luil lee 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: ¥ , 
I certify that I am the attorney lor ^JJ-i (k Y<£ Hr-Cf-^A*—
 # jhc defendant named above ami 1 know he 
has read t'*.e AtlidaMi. or that I have read u to htm, and I dtscussed it with htm and believe he lull) mulct ttands the 
meaning ot its contents and ismcntalK and physically competent. To the best ot my knowledge and belie! the *UICII.C:MS. 
representations and declarations made bv the delendant in the lorc-joine \Ilwla\ 0>*-e-Kj all respects accurate ami tri.e. 
Hased upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendants pica «>i 
guilt\ is freeiy and voluntarily made and it ts ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth m the 
Athdavit be jeecpted and entered. * 
„JS Done in Court t.his ^ ^ 
Ai i inrr * 
g v « q g 
-j£<Ml£his$X ,C079 
Distuct Judge 
r -v..~. 
ADDENDUM B 
Transcr ip t of Rick Hickman's 
Guil ty Plea Colloquy 
s 
2 c 
o 
o 
§ 
£5 
< 
§ 
W 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
JA20JARY 18, 1985 1:30 P.M. 
Tli: COURT: State of Utah verses Rick Keith Hickman. 
There are two files on this. Are we going to handle then-, both 
at the sarre tine? 
MR. GARCIA: Manny Garcia with Mr. Hickman, Your 
Honor. This also will be the entry of a plea. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to state what 
the plea is going to be? 
MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, it's the same thing as 
what we just die because there is one additional consideration. 
This case —Mr. Hickman is prepared to plead guilty to Count 3 
of 84-1436; Counts 1 and 2 are to be dismissed in the exchange 
for his plea on this case. The other case that you have for 
arraignment, and I don't have a Circuit Court number, I just 
have the District Court number — I don't have a District 
Court, I have an 84 FS 2514 which reflected a burglary, 
second, and aggravated sexual assault, a first degree. Those 
cases will be dismissed in their entirety. 
THE COURT: For the record CR-85-33 — 
MR. GARCIA: And there is one other case, Your Honor, 
which I don't have the file here today. That case was supposed 
to be arraigned in front of Judge Rokich .Monday morning. In that 
case there is a robbery and burglary of the West Valley incident 
reflected in that case. That case will also be dismissed. That is 
,.CQQ2£ 
10 
11 
12 
1 also part of this bargain. And the information in this case 
2 will be reflected — it would be amended to reflect deadly 
3 weapon rather than a fact firearm or facsimile thereof, 
4 and that can be done either by delineation — and I believe that 
5 is now — I don't have the case numoer of that other case which is 
6 I to be arraigned in front of Judge Rokich. I will certainly get 
7 that and enter that. So that is the extent of the agreement 
6 frctr. Mr. Hickman as well. 
9 THE COURT: All right. I need to ask you a few 
questions, Mr. Hicknan. As I understand it, then, yoj're 
going to plead to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
and as I understand it, that's punishable by a term m the — 
13 I maximum term m the Utah State Penitentiary of at least five 
14 years, not more than life, plus a fine of $10,000 or both, plus 
15 j you could also be ordered to pay restitution if there is any. 
16 I Any restitution involved in this case, Mr. D'Elia? 
17 I MR. D'ELIA: I'm not quite sure. 
18 I MR. GARCIA: I don't think there is. 
MR. D'ELIA: There's not. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GARCIA: Although, well, that's my information 
that there isn't. I believe that's accurate. I don't think 
23 I anything is owing Mr. Kelson at this time. 
24 IKE COURT: In any event, then, the maxunur sentence 
25 | could be a fine of up to $10,000 and a prison sentence up to life. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Do you understand that's a possible sentence that you could 
receive? 
MR. IHCKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And although you ray have got sere 
advice from your attorney about what you think you'll serve 
out there and so forth, none of those things are binding on me 
or on the parole; you ray be out there for your whole life.- It's 
possible. Do you understand that's a possibility? 
MR. KICXMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And that the fine could be inposed in 
addition to that. Do you 'understand that's a possibility, too? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Ckay. New, you were here when I was talking 
to Mr. Hickman, your brother, about his constitutional rights? Vfere 
you listening at that time? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And ycu understand you have the same 
constitutional rights, trial by jury and all those things? Do you 
understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And if you enter a plea of guilty, you 
waive all those rights, do you understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, have you had a chance 
to read that affidavit that's there? 
>£{)0 30 
1 MR. HICKMAN: Yes, I have. 
2 THE COURT: And you do read and understand the English — 
3 I MR. HI OMAN: Yes, I do. 
4 THE COURT: And understand what the affidavit says? 
5 MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: Are you willing to sign it in open court? 
7 MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
g THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it before 
9 you do? 
10 
11 
19 
20 
21 
MR. KICXMAN: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Before you do that, I want to go 
12 I over again the elements of the offense. What they'd have to prove 
13 before the jury could find you guilty and have to prove each 
14 element beyond a reasonable doubt. They'd have to prove that 
15 at 965 South 2200 East in Salt Lake County on or about November 1, 1984 
16 you unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the 
T7 possession of A.W. Kelson from his immediate presence against 
8^ I his will using same sort of a deadly weapon. They'd have to 
prove all those things. They'd have to prove against his will, you 
did intentionally, you used some sort of a deadly weapon, prove 
it was in Salt Lake County, prove about the time it was. Each 
22 I one of those things they'd have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
23 ^° y° u understand that? 
24 MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
25 THE ODURT: And then my question is are you pleading 
^ 
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guilty because you are in fact guilty? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
IKS CCURT: All right. 
MR. D'ELIA: Excuse ire Your Honor. Before that goes 
on, his elements I think should be edited on the records as 
parties to the offense because that would be very importer t 
in pleading as far as the elements are concerned. 
IKE ODURT: All right. 
MR. D'ELIA: The other thing is I was just making 
a representation before on the restitution, not being directly 
familiar with the specifics cf this case, I do understand there 
was a shooting involved, and I'm not quite sure what AP&P, whan 
a person is injured with respect to restitution. I'm not saying 
there is, I'm just indicating for the record that might come up 
at a later day. 
TEE COURT: All right. 
MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, there's one thing that I 
forgot to mention also about the agreements with the state. 
In exchange for this plea is that there was another pending 
burglary which the state knew of that they thought Mr. Hickman 
was involved that they are also not going to file. So other 
cases they knew of will not be filed. 
THE ODURT: All right. Mr. Hickman, you're not 
under the influence of any drugs or alcohol or anything of that 
'-CC032 
10 
1 nature, are you? 
2 MR. HICKMAN: No, sir. 
3 | -IKE COURT: Taking any rredication at all? 
4 MR. HICKMAN: No. 
5 THE COURT: Nothing like that that would affect your 
6 judgement in any way, is that true? 
7 MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: And no one has threatened you in any 
9 way to get you to plead guilty? 
MR. HICKMAN: No. 
j j I THE COURT: No cne has premised you anything other 
12 than the other charges would be dismissed; is that right? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir." 
14 I THE COURT: All right. Does the State have a Motion 
15 then to dismiss those charges? 
MR. D'ELIA: Your Honor, the State at this time 
7^ I would again as before, keep the same interdelineaticn; firearrs, 
18 J strike the language. 
Also with respect to Count 1 and 2, the State would 
move to formally dismiss those counts. We are aware of the 
one South Salt Lake case with the aggravated burglary and the 
sexual assault that's being dismissed. 
23 I MR. GARCIA: Right. 
24 i MR. D'ELIA: We move for that. And move for the 
25 I West Valley case that was waived to be dismissed. 
13 
16 
19 
20 
21 
22 
t .o 
C0.33 
MR. GARCIA: The Circuit —- 34-2367? 
MR. D'ELIA: And with respect to the pending burglary, 
also the state is aware of those charges and will not file 
charges pursuant to the agreement as well as any other counts 
that might arise out of this same criminal episode. 
MR. GARCIA: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Then let me ask you, Mr. 
Hickman, hew do you plead to the charge of the aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony? 
MR. HICKMAN: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead and sign that affidavit. 
MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, I apologize for parts of 
this affidavit being scratched out when I myself changed 
for facsimile of a deadly weapon and the affidavit doesn't 
reflect the circuit court numbers in there because I don't have 
the circuit court numbers. As long as it's understood what 
case we are talking about, that shouldn't be any problem. 
THE COURT: Based upon my questioning of Mr. Hickman, 
I find the plea has been entered freely and voluntarily, 
understandingly and doing it of his own free will, understanding 
the consequences and I'm signing the affidavit. 
Now, Mr.. Hickman, it's ny duty to sentence you at a 
time not sooner than two or later than 30 days unless those time 
periods are waived by you. What is your pleasure? 
MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, Mr. Hickman has no expectation 
8 
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of E presentence report would benefit.him. I informed the 
court he is on parole with the Federal bank robbery charge 
that he anticipates he's going to be doing some more time at 
least another three years. At this time he's willing to waive 
his minimum time and ask sentence be imposed today, realizing 
the court will have no choice but to commit him to the Utah 
State Prison. He's willing to do that at this point. 
MR. D'ELIA: Your Honor, in light, especially of• the 
parole violation and the Federal bank robbery charge, we ask 
the maximum five to life. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hickman, then, I'm going 
to sentence you to confinement in the Utah State Penitentiary for 
the term not less than five years, more than life and 
full amount of restitution as determined by the Board of Pardons, 
and that commitment being commenced forthwith. 
MR. GARCIA: Thank you. 
Oh, Your Honor, I also — excuse me — he also has 
some property that was taken when he was arrested. 
MR. D'ELIA: No objection to that, Your Honor. 
MR. GARCIA: Could we have that order? 
THE COURT: It will be released. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
STATE 
-vs-
DEAN 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
KEITH HICKMAN, 
Defendant. 
* * * * 
• 
• 
• 
« 
• 
JANUARY 18, 
ARRAIGNMENT & 
* 
CR-84-
1985 
-1436 
SENTENCING 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
FRANCIS G. D'ELIA, ESQ. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BROOKE C. WELLS, ESQ. 
Legal Defender's Office 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Co/7/ 
00060 
1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 I THE COURT: We'll return, then, to State of Utah 
3 jverses Dean Keith Hickman. 
4 MS. WELLS: Your Honor, Brooke Wells appearing on 
5 behalf of Mr. Hickman who is present. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Are you Mr. Dean Keith 
7 Hickman? 
8 MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
9 THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to talk 
10 I with your attorney, Ms. Wells, before the hearing? 
11 I1R. HICKMAN: Yeah. 
12 THE COURT: And are you ready to enter a plea at 
13 this time? 
H MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
15 THE COURT: Is there going — 
16 MS. WELLS: There will be a plea that we will ask 
17 the Court to accept, Your Honor. At this time we are asking 
IS the Court to accept Mr. Hickman's plea to Count III of the 
19 Information which is presently before it. That will be a 
20 plea of guilty to Count III, which is Aggravated Robbery, 
21 a First Degree Felony. In exchange for Mr. Hickman's plea of 
22 guilty, we anticipate that the State will do the following. 
23 First, that it will amend the information that is 
24 presently before the Court to indicate that the aggravated 
25 robbery, which Mr. Hickman is entering a plea to, would have 
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been committed with a deadly weapon, but will not specify 
that weapon was a firearm. My affidavit so indicates at this 
time. 
We also anticipate that the State will move to 
dismiss Counts I and II of the Information before it. That 
the State will file no other cases presently known to it. 
And that another case which was — preliminary hearing was 
held at the same time this one was out of Nest Valley City, 
will be dismissed. Unfortunately because I was in trial, I 
don't have that other file number with me. It has not come 
up for arraignment in the District Court. But I think we can 
be specific enough about it on the affidavit that we know 
which case it is. 
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I can give you the Circuit Court --[ 
MS. WELLS: Perhaps the Circuit Court number would, 
at least — 
MR. D'ELIA: Your Honor, on that, our office is in 
the process of looking it up, was going to call to give 
the District Court number. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you a few 
questions, then, Mr. Hickman. As I understand it, you're 
going to plead guilty to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, 
a First Degree Felony. If I have it right, that is punishable^ 
by a maximum sentence of a life sentence no less than five, 
no more than life in the Utah State Penitentiary and a fine is 
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$15,000. 
MS. WELLS: Ten thousand dollars. 
THE COURT: Ten thousand dollars or both, the fine 
and the prison sentence. And even though they are amending 
their complaint to delete the language about the firearm, I 
suppose he could be sentenced — 
KS. WELLS: No, Your Honor, that is the reason for 
the amendment at this time. The statute states that'where a 
firearm is used, that there is a mandatory enhancement which 
this Court must sentence the Defendant to. We are asking the 
Court to accept the State's amendment to avoid that enhancemer) 
clause, and that's the reason for the amendment. 
THE COURT: But isn't the sentence based on whether 
a firearm is used, not on what the State charges in the 
Information? 
MS. WELLS: I don't believe so. And that would be 
based upon proof that may or may not have come out at the 
preliminary hearing. But where the State amends that,it would 
be similar to our being involved in some of the minimum 
mandatory cases charging sexual offenses. If the State amend§ 
out the language which requires the minimum mandatory or 
in this case the enhancement, then the Court, I don't believe 
has that prerogative . Is that your understanding? 
MR. D'ELIA: Your Honor, that's my understanding, 
if a firearm is not specifically alleged, Your Honor, over to 
a deadly weapon, the enhancement — 
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THE COURT: All right. So you could be sentenced to 
as much as five in life in the the Utah State Penitentiary, 
$10,000 fine, plus any restitution, if there's any damage 
caused. Do you understand that's a possibility? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And even though whatever your attorney 
may have told you about, advice she may have given you, or what 
the County attorneys agreed to recommend, none of those 
agreements are binding on me, and I might give you the full 
sentence. Do you understand that's a possibility? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And that if I did give you the full 
sentence, then you decided it wasn't a good idea to plead 
guilty, it wculd be too late. You couldn't withdraw your 
plea anyway. Do you understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, you're not under — today 
under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or anything of that 
nature? 
MR. HICKMAN: No, sir. 
21
 J THE COURT: Taking any medication of any kind? 
2 2
 I MR. HICKMAN: No. 
23
 I THE COURT: Nothing that would affect your judgement 
2 4
 I in that way? 
MR. HICKMAN: No, not that I know of. 
5 
25 
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THE COURT: You understand if you plead not guilty, 
you have a constitutional right to a trial by jury. We' would 
ibring the jury inhere. I'd tell them that you are innocent 
|until proven guilty. You'd be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty. The State has the burden of proving you are guilty, 
i 
I have to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonably 
jdoubt. They'd have — the jury would have to agree unanimous 
that you were guilty before you could be found guilty, 
i You'd have your attorney with you all through the 
;trial, question any witnesses that the state produced. You 
i 
jcould bring in witnesses if you wanted to. You could testify 
i 
Ion your own behalf if you wanted to. You have all those 
jrights. Do you understand that? 
i 
| MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And then by pleading guilty, it's — 
you waive all those rights so you are found guilty the same 
as if the jury found you guilty of Aggravated Robbery. Do 
you understand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Let me — I want you to understand what 
the elements of the offense are, make sure you know what 
they'd have to prove. 
They would have to prove that in Salt Lake County 
at about 965 South 2200 East, on or about November 1st, 1984, 
you unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in 
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possession of A. W. Kelson or from'his immediate person by 
threatening with some sort of a deadly weapon. They'd have 
to prove it was in Salt Lake County. They'd have to prove the) 
date, prove you did it to A. W. Kelson. All those things-they) 
have to prove, all the elements that are read. Do you under-
stand that? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Is the reason 
that you are pleading guilty of this charge because you are 
guilty of it? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. What's your level of 
education? 
MR. HICKMAN: Twelfth. 
•THE COURT: And having finished twelfth grade, can 
you read and understand the English language? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you had a chance to read that 
iaff idavit? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. And do you understand what it sayls? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you willing to sign it? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you have any questions about it 
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before you do? 
MR. KICKMAN: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can go ahead and sign it, thejn 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would ask that the State 
make the Motion to amend that count — 
MR. D'ELIA: Whenever you are ready, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
MR. D'ELIA: The State would move at this time to 
amend Count III by crossing out on the third line up where it 
says a firearm, from that point, firearm, all the way through 
and substitute a deadly weapon by delineation. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. D'ELIA: And also to dismiss Counts I and II as 
(pertains to Mr. Hickman, Mr. Dean Hickman as party to the 
bffense. And with respect to the other charges, as Ms. Wells 
represented, we would stipulate that that's the agreement, 
17 no other charges in connection with this offense will be filed 
18 
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THE COURT: The Motion will be granted. 
Let me ask you Mr. Hickman, after everything we've 
|said, you still want to plead guilty to this? 
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And then, let me ask you, how do you 
blead to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree 
felony, guilty or not guilty? 
MR. HICKMAN: Guilty. 
8 
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THE COURT: Okay. You-can go ahead and sign that 
affidavit. 
MS. WELLS: He has signed it, Your Honor, in open 
court. I would also indicate Mr. D'Elia has, and I have also 
signed the affidavit. 
THE COURT: Based on the questions I asked Mr. 
Hickman, I find it's a plea entered freely and voluntarily, 
and I'm accepting the plea and signing the affidavit. It's 
my duty to sentence you in a time not sooner than two or laterj 
than 30 days unless those time periods are waived by you. 
What's your pleasure in that regard? 
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, we would waive the minimum 
and ask the Court to impose sentence today. The Court may 
or may not know Mr. Hickman is presently on probation for a 
felony offense to Judge Banks. An Order to Show Cause has beeri 
filed in that matter, and we will be indicating to Judge Banks; 
that this plea will have been entered. Based upon that, we 
feel that there is no real benefit to be gained from asking fqr 
a pre-sentence report, and we would ask the Court to impose 
sentence today, understanding that the Court would have no 
alternative but to impose the statutory period of time. 
MR. D'ELIA: That would be the request from the 
State to impose the maximum sentence. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sentence you, Mr. Hickman, 
to serve a term in the Utah State Penitentiarv of not less 
0068 
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1 than five years nor longer than life, ro be transported there 
2
 forewith, I suppose. 
3
 MS. WELLS: One other matter. At the time both 
4
 brothers, Hickman, were arrested, certain pieces of personal 
5 property, their clothing, were taken into evidence. I would 
6 ask the Court for an Order releasing that either to them 
7
 for transportation to the Utah State Prison with them or to 
8 a person of their choice since this is personal property, 
9 just items of personal property and clothing. 
10
 I MR. D'ELIA: No objection to personal items. 
11
 I THE COURT: That will be the Order 
12 {Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I Susan Sprouse, do hereby certify that I am 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah; 
That as such Reporter, I attended the hearing of 
the foregoing natter and thereat reported in stenotype 
all of the testimony and proceedings had, and caused said 
11 jnotes to be transcribed into typewriting and the foregoing 
12 pages constitute a full, true, and correct report of the same 
13 DATED at Salt Lake County , Utah, this 13th day 
14
 I June, 1988 
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17
 Susan S. Sprouse, CSR/RPR 
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ADDENDUM D 
S t a t e v . Hickman, 779 P.2d 670 (Utah 1989) 
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[1,2] At first blush, H is difficult to 
determine the basis of the district court's 
ruling. It might be argued that it treated 
the motion to dismiss as a motion for sum-
mary judgment, pursuant to rule 66. Utah 
R.Ov.P. 66. If it had done so, it might 
have found the facte pertaining to the dis-
charge and the policy manual, as set forth 
in the depositions, to be without dispute 
and determined that under the terms of the 
manual, Lowe was properly discharged 
However, we conclude that the district 
court did not base its ruling on any deter-
mination that the relevant facts were un-
disputed or on any construction of the man-
ual; rather, it appears that the court decid-
ed that even if Lowe's factual assertions in 
the complaint were correct, they provided 
no legal basis for recovery. We are led to 
this conclusion because the trial judge nev-
er unsealed the depositions taken by the 
parties and deposited with the clerk; there-
fore, he could not have resolved any of the 
flatly conflicting assertions in the parties' 
memoranda regarding what discovery had 
revealed. See Thompson v. Ford Motor 
Co., 884 P.2d 109,109 (Utah 1968). More-
over, the policy manual was never intro-
duced into evidence. The court could only 
have considered the facts alleged in the 
complaint, which had to be taken as true 
for purposes of the motion to dismiss and 
dismissed the complaint under rule 12(bX6). 
We must now determine whether, on the 
facts alleged in Lowe's complaint, the law 
may provide any relief. 
The district court's dismissal of the com-
plaint occurred before our recent decision 
of Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. In that 
case, we refused to recognise a variety of 
wrongful discharge actions sounding in 
tort However, we did recognize that al-
though there is a presumption that employ-
ment is terminable at will, that presump-
tion can be rebutted. Berube, 771 R2d at 
1044 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), 
1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the re-
sult); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis 
Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 488, 4&5-4S6 0989). 
If the presumption is rebutted, the dis-
charged employee may have a claim for 
breach of contract if the employer dis-
charged the employee without complying 
with the terms of the agreement under 
which the employee worked Berube, 771 
P*2d at 1044-46, 1060 (Durham, J., joined 
by Stewart, J.), 1052-68 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); Caldwell, 777 
P.2dat486. Under the factual allegations 
of the complaint filed in the present case, 
RTER,2d SERIES 
Lowe has stated such a claim for breach of 
contract She claims generally that her 
discharge was in violation of the terms of a 
company manual that prescribed policies 
and procedures governing the discharge of 
employees. Construing these allegations 
in a light most favorable to Lowe, the facts 
support a claim for contract damages un-
der Berube. See Berube, 771 P.2d at 
1044-46 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.), 
1060 (Howe, Assoc. C J., concurring, joined 
by Hall, CJ.), 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., con-
curring in the result); Caldwell, 777 P.2d 
at 486. Therefore, we vacate the grant of 
the motion to dismiss and remand for fur-
ther proceedings. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
(© lOYIIUMIHSYSTlMl 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rick Keith HICKMAN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
• . 
Dean Keith HICKMAN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
Not. 880806, 880862. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 17, 1989. 
Defendants moved to set aside guilty 
pleas to charges of aggravated robbery. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Scott Daniels, J., denied the motions. De-
fendants appealed. The Supreme Court 
held that (1) there was factual basis for 
plea where defendants entered the victim's 
house and shot the victim, though no prop* % 
erty was taken, and (2) plea of one defen-
dant would not be set aside on ground he 
was not asked by trial court whether he 
entered into guilty plea without threats, 
promises or inducements, where record tak-
en as a whole showed plea was entered 
without threats or promises. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result 
C0128 
STATE v, 
OumTntM 
I. Criminal Law *»1149 
Supreme Court will uphold the denial 
by the trial court of motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea, absent abuse of discretion. 
1 Criminal Law #»273(4) 
There was factual basis for trial court 
to accept the pleas of guilty to aggravated 
robbery by defendants who did not take 
any property from the victim, where the 
defendants did enter the victim's house 
with a shotgun and shot the victim while 
attempting to commit a robbery. U.C.A. 
1963, 76-6-802. 
1 Robbery *»12 
Under statute, the entry into the home 
of the victim with sawed-off shotguns con-
stituted a "substantia] step towards the 
commission of the offense" of robbery, and 
thus an attempted robbery. U.CAJ953, 
J§ 7&4-101, 76-6-502. 
4. Criminal Law *»U67(5) 
Failure to ask defendant if the guilty 
plea was entered free from threats, prom-
ises, and inducements was not reversible 
error where defendant signed an affidavit 
stating he had entered the plea free from 
threats, promises and inducements and the 
trial court asked the defendant whether he 
had read the affidavit, determining the de-
fendant did voluntarily enter into the 
agreement, and witnessed the affidavit 
U.CJL1953, { 77-S6-ll(eX4, 6), (f). 
Rick Keith Hickman, pro ae. 
Dean Keith Hickman, pro se. 
David L. Wilkinson, Sandra L. Sjogren, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendants appeal from the denial of 
their motions to set aside their guilty pleas 
to charges of aggravated robbery, Utah 
Code Ann. | 76-6-802 (1978). We affirm 
the trial court's rulings. 
Defendants are two of three brothers 
who were involved in the forced entry of a 
residence in Salt Lake City in November of 
1984. According to the probable cause 
statement, defendants were armed with 
HICKMAN Utah 6 7 1 
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aawed-off shotguns and shot one victim at 
dose range when he resisted their demands 
to empty pockets of personal belongings. 
Defendants were later charged with at-
tempted first degree murder, aggravated 
burglary and aggravated robbery. In Jan-
nary of 1985, defendants pleaded guilty to 
aggravated robbery pursuant to a plea 
agreement that dismissed the other two 
counts as well as unrelated charges. In a 
consolidated bearing before the trial court, 
defendants moved to withdraw their guilty • 
pleas in July of 1988. The motions were; 
denied, and defendants appealed separate-
ly. This Court again consolidated the two 
cases. 
[1] We uphold the trial court's denial of 
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea absent 
abuse of discretion. State v. West, 765 
?2d 891 (Utah 1988); State v. Mildenhall, 
747 ?M 422 (Utah 1987). 
[2] Defendants contend that it was er-
ror for the trial court to accept their guilty 
pleas to aggravated robbery, because no 
property was actually taken from the vic-
tims. Consequently, they say, no factual 
basis existed for the plea. In support of 
that claim, defendants point to a separate 
hearing before the same trial judge, where 
their brother Boyd successfully argued 
that no property was actually taken during 
the holdup and where the trial court al-
lowed the guilty plea to be withdrawn. De-
fendants fail to acknowledge that they 
were armed, whereas their brother was 
not That factual distinction is dispositive 
here. 
In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 698 
(Utah 1988), the defendant similarly at-
tacked his conviction of aggravated rob-
bery on the ground that nothing had been 
taken from the person or immediate pres-
ence of the victim. He argued that that 
taking was an element that had to be 
proved in order to establish the offense. 
We responded in language that ends the 
inquiry on the same issue now before us: 
We do not agree. Aggravated robbery is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. { 76-6-802 
(1978): 
* - r-
• - m* 
Z m 
' . J 
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0) A person commits aggravated rob-
bery & in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife 
or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(8) For the purposes of this part, an 
act shall be deemed to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit, dur-
ing the commission of, or in the imme-
diate flight after the attempt or com-
mission of a robbery. 
(Emphasis added.) Our statutory 
scheme does not require proof of all 
elements necessary to prove a robbery, 
specifically, a taking from the "person, 
or immediate presence," to eet&blkh 
the "in the course of committing a 
robbery" requirement of aggravated 
robbery. So long as there is an at-
tempt, coupled with the use of a fire-
arm, knife, facsimile thereof, or anoth-
er deadly weapon, or the accused 
causes serious bodily injury, the ele-
ments of aggravated robbery are satis-
fied 
[8] Defendants' entry into the home of 
the victims with sawed-off shotguns consti-
tuted the attempt, since it was a "substan-
tial step towards the commission of the 
offense" under Utah Code Ann. ( 76-4-101 
(1978). That action also satisfied the ele-
ment of "in the course of committing a 
robbery" under section 76-6*802(1). The 
actual shooting satisfied both subsections 
(a) and (b) of that same section, thus consti-
tuting the elements of aggravated robbery 
that provided the factual basis for the con-
victions. 
1. State v. Gibbons hsd not been decided at the 
time defendants entered their pleas. This Court 
has previously stated that when a new rule; of 
criminal procedure constitutes a clear break 
with the past, it will not be applied retroac-
tively. State v. Norton, 675 ?2d 577 (Utah 
1983), cert denied. 466 VS. *42.104 S.CL 1*23, 
SO LEd.2d 470 (1984), overruled en ether 
grounds, Suae v. Hansen. 734 ?2d 421 (Utah 
1986); accord State v. Vasitacopulos, 756 fc2d 
92 (Utah App.1988); eee also State v. Jonas, 725 
F.2d 1378 (Utah 1986) (discretionary use of cau-
Def endants also claim that an attempt at 
aggravated robbery, defined under section 
76-4-102(2), reduces a felony of the first 
degree to a felony of the second degree and 
that they were therefore improperly sen-
tenced to a first degree felony. We need 
not address that issue, inasmuch as defen-
dants were properly convicted of aggrava-
ted robbery, as stated above. 
[4] Defendant Dean Keith Hickman 
also claims that the trial court failed to u\ 
him, before accepting his plea, whether hi* 
plea of guilty was entered free from 
threats, promises, and inducements, as re-
quired by rule ll(eX4), (6), and (f) of the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as by 
rule 8.6 of the Pules of Practice. He cites 
State v. Gibho+*} 740 ?2d 1809 (Utah 
1987),1 which places the burden of estab-
lishing comph&nce with these requirements 
on the trial court Although it is true that 
the trial court did not specifically ask Dean 
"whether any force or threats or any prom-
ises, apart from plea agreement, were used 
to obtain the plea,9' Rule of Practice 8.6(B), 
that omission was the only one that could 
be ascribed to the trial judge. The affida-
vit signed by Dean did contain the lan-
guage, and the trial court asked defendant 
whether he had read it and then stated that 
based on the questions he had asked Dean, 
he found that Dean had entered the pies 
freely and voluntarily. The trial court then 
witnessed the affidavit previously signed 
by Dean. The record as a whole thus 
affirmatively establishes that Dean entered 
his guilty plea free from threats or prom-
ises. Warner v. Morris,t 709 P.2d 809 
(Utah 1985) (citing North Carolina v. Al 
ford, 400 VS. 26, 91 S.Ct 160, 27 LE<L2d 
162 (1970); Brady v. United States, W 
VS. 742, 90 S.Ct 1468, 26 LJkL2d 747 
tfonary eyewitness instruction applied* whet 
case was tried before State v. Long, 721 T3d 483 
(Utah 1986), which mandated use, prospectively, 
of cautionary instruction whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue). 
2. Although this case, too. was decided after de-
fendants' entries of pleas, it nonetheless applied 
the standard required by Afford, Brady, end 
Boykin, decided prior to defendants' pleas. 
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(1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 895 UJS. 288, 1 Waters and Water Courses #»163 
89 S.Ct 1709, 28 UE&2d 274 (1969)). Constitutional prohibition against 
The denial of defendants' motions for transfers of municipal water rights is di-
withdrawal of guilty pleas is affirmed. ***** against voluntary transfers only, 
not against involuntary transfers. U.C.A. 
STEWART, J.t concurs in the m u l t 1958' w"1"* CnmL A r t U ' * 6' 
(© tgvyyittsYSTiM, 
NEPHI CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Dee C HANSEN, State Engineer of the 
State of Utah; and Utah State Division 
of Wildlife Resources, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 860614. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 81, 1989. 
City sought judicial review of a deci-
sion of the state engineer that the city had 
forfeited its nonconsumptive water rights 
through nonuse. The Fourth District 
Court, Juab County, Boyd L. Park, J., up-
held the decision. City appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that (1) 
the city forfeited its nonconsumptive water 
rights by not using those rights for approx-
imately 80 years, and (2) the constitutional 
prohibition against transfer of municipal 
water rights is directed against voluntary 
transfers, not involuntary transfers and, 
thus, a forfeiture of municipal water rights 
through nonuse did not violate the Consti-
tution. 
Affirmed. 
L Waters and Water Courses *»161 
City forfeited its nonconsumptive wa-
ter rights by not using those rights for 
approximately 30 years. U.CJL1953,78-1-
4. 
Donald J. Eyre, Nephi, for plaintiff and 
appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Michael M. Quealy, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel-
lees. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Nephi City appeals from an or-
der denying its motion for summary judg-
ment and granting the motion of defendant 
Dee C. Hansen, State Engineer, and defen-
dant Utah State Division of Wildlife Re-
sources for summary judgment The sum-
mary judgment upheld the State Engi-
neer's decision rejecting Nephi City's appli-
cations to change the points of diversion of 
four claimed water rights. The State Engi-
neer rejected the applications on the 
grounds that the four water rights in ques-
tion had been forfeited through nonuse un-
der section 78-1-4 of the Code. Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-1-4 (1980) (amended 1987 & 
1988). Nephi City claims that a municipal 
corporation's water rights cannot constitu-
tionally be forfeited through nonuse under 
article XI, section 6 of the Utah Constitu-
tion. It contends that to the extent that 
section 78-1-4 provides for such a forfei-
ture, it is unconstitutional. We reject Ne-
phi City's assertions and affirm the district 
court 
The material facts are not in dispute. 
During the first half of this century, Nephi 
City acquired four nonconsumptive water 
rights on Salt Creek in Juab County. The 
beneficial use to which they were to be put 
was power generation. Nephi City used 
these water rights to generate electricity 
until the early 1950s, when a flood on Salt 
Creek destroyed the diversion and convey-
ing works. From the flood until the early 
1980s, these water rights were not benefi-
cially used by Nephi (Sty. 
In 1982, Nephi City proposed to con-
struct a new hydroelectric facility. Pursu-
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Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
SEP i 3 !SS3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN K. HICKMAN, 
RICK K. HICKMAN, 
Petitioners, 
TAMARA HOLDEN, 
FRED VAN DER VEUR, 
Respondents, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 920902029 HC 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Petitioners' petition for habeas corpus or post-conviction 
relief came before the court for an evidentiary hearing July 27 and 
28, 1993, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. Petitioners 
were present and were represented by Andrea C. Alcabes. 
Respondents were represented by Angela F. Micklos, Assistant 
Attorney General. After hearing testimony, receiving evidence, and 
hearing arguments of counsel, the Court, being fully advised, now 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 18, 1985, Petitioners pled guilty to 
aggravated robbery. 
C0156 
2. Petitioner Dean Hickman was represented by Brooke Wells. 
Petitioner Rick Hickman was represented by Manny Garcia. 
3. On or about December 15, 1984, petitioners met with their 
attorneys in a room in the circuit court building to discuss the 
charges against them. 
4. Detective Don Bell of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department came in at least during the latter portion of the 
meeting between petitioners and their attorneys. 
5. Brooke Wells had some discovery materials relating to the 
aggravated robbery charges. 
6. Ms. Wells neither shared the physical discovery materials 
with petitioners, nor discussed their content with great 
specificity. However, she did advise petitioners, at least in a 
conclusory manner, that there was substantial evidence against 
them. 
7. Two of the prosecution's potential witnesses were co-
conspirators . 
8. Petitioners had a pending order to show cause proceeding 
pending before Judge Banks. 
9. In 1988, petitioners filed a motion to withdraw their 
pleas, which Judge Daniels denied. 
10. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the denial of 
petitioners' motion. 
2 
C0157 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Even if all of petitioners' allegations regarding 
counsels' deficiencies are true, petitioners failed to prove that 
absent counsels' errors, they would have insisted upon going to 
trial. 
2. Petitioners failed to meet the prejudice prong necessary 
to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as stated in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
ORDER 
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED as follows: The petition for habeas corpus or post-
conviction relief is denied. 
DATED this 12 —day of 1fff?gSrt7 1993. 
Approved as to form: 
/s/ 
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
Attorney for petitioners 
3 
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CERTIPICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing unsigned FINDINGS OP PACT, CONCLUSIONS OP LAW AND ORDER 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ H day of August, 1993 to: 
Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq. 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
136 South Main Street, Suite 910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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ADDENDUM F 
Depos i t i on of Brooke Wells 
CERTIFIED COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT POR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
DEAN K. HICKMAN, 
RICK K. HICKMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, 
FRED VAN DER VEUR, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 920902029 
(Judge Kenneth Rigtrup) 
Deposition of: 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Deposition of BROOKE C. WELLS, taken at the 
instance and request of the Defendants, at the Utah State 
Prison Oguirrh 5 facility, Draper, Utah, on Wednesday, June 
16, 1993, at 12:08 p.m., before Vicky McDaniel, a Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the state 
of Utah, Utah License No. 285. 
* * * 
Associated Professional Reporters 
10 West Broadway / Suite 800 / Salt lAke City, Utah 84101 
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Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq. 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN 
& QUIGLEY 
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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2525 
Paula Glassett 
Dean Hickman 
Rick Hickman 
The Witness 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
I N D E X 
Page 
Examination by Ms. Mick los 
E X H I B I T S 
Number ?age 
A (1-13-88 letter to Dean Hickman 
from Ms. Wells) 9 
* * * 
3 
P f t O C E g p ? N G S 
PR00KE WEfrLS, 
called as a witness at the instance of the 
Defendants, having first been duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATIQN 
PY fis. WICEI^ OS: 
MS. MICKLOS: I suppose since this is just in 
lieu of the testimony that would have been taken at the 
evidentiary hearing that we will just proceed as we would 
had we been at the hearing. 
MS. ALCABES: Okay. 
MS. MICKLOS: In other words, Brooke would be my 
witness and I would just do some direct examination and you 
can cross examine. 
MS. ALCABES: Fine. 
MS. MICKLOS: And also# just for the record 
before we begin, Ifm just going to object to Mr. Rick 
Hickman's presence only because Ms. Wells did not represent 
Rick Hickman, and so therefore her testimony is really 
irrelevant as far as he's concerned. His claims go to Andy 
Garcia1s representation of him and not Ms. Wells9. So I 
realize there*s nothing that can be done about it at this 
point. I just want to make that clear that— 
MS. ALCABES: Well, for the record, if you want 
1 to address that now, Rick was present on some of the 
2 occasions in question and he is a petitioner in this matter, 
3 they1re both petitioners— 
4 MS. MICKLOS: That's true. 
5 MS. ALCABES: —and I think he has the right to 
6 be here present to confront witnesses against him. 
7 Q (BY MS. MICKLOS) So we'll go on. Please State 
8 your name. 
9 A Brooke Wells. 
10 Q And what is your occupation? 
11 A Attorney. 
12 Q How long have you been an attorney? 
13 A Sixteen years this—sixteen years in September. 
14 Q Did you represent Dean Hickman in 1984 and '85 on 
15 an aggravated robbery charge? 
16 A I represented him on that as well as on another 
17 matter. 
18 Q Okay. And there are several claims that 
19 Mr. Hickman has made against you. First of all, Mr. Hickman 
20 claims that you coerced him into pleading guilty. Is that 
21 true? 
22 A No. 
23 Q He claims specifically that you threatened him 
24 with additional charges if he were not to take the plea. 
25 Did you make that statement? 
1 I A I would have not made such a statement, first of 
2 | all because I don't have the authority to bring charges. I 
3 I do, however, believe that I advised him that other charges— 
4 I that there was a potential for other charges out there. 
5 Q Okay. 
6 A And specifically as a part of any plea agreement 
7 I the state would agree not to file other charges. 
8 1 Q Be further claims that—did you make any 
9 I representation to Mr. Hickman regarding the specific number 
10 I of years he might spend in prison as a result of the plea or 
11 I as a result of not entering the plea? 
12 A All right. I would not have told him that he 
13 would serve a specific number. There's many reasons*for 
14 that. First of all, it9s clear that Board of Pardons has 
15 that option. Given the plea bargain that he was offered, 
16 I however, Z did advise him to accept the plea to the one 
17 I count of aggravated robbery without a firearm enhancement 
18 I because that would minimise the amount of time that he would 
19 I do to a minimum of five as opposed to a possible minimum of 
20 I up to 30 if he were convicted of each of the three counts 
21 I against him in that information, each of which carried a 
22 I five to life and each of which carried a firearm 
23 I enhancement. 
24 Q At any time did you ever tell him that if he did 
25 I not accept the plea he would do 13 years? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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24 
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A No. I would have had no way of knowing how much 
tine he could have expected to do, because that's within the 
purview of the Board of Pardons. 
Q Mr. Hickman also claims that you allowed 
Detective Bell to be present during some confidential 
discussions, attorney-client discussions. Is that true? 
A No, that is not true, and I have insufficient 
information about what his claim is to be able to answer 
anything more specifically about it. I don't know when he's 
claiming that occurred, where, under what circumstances. I 
don't know. 
Q At any time do you recall having Detective Bell 
present when you were speaking with Mr. Hickman? 
A I do not recall that. Detective Bell was present 
at the court proceedings the day that—in the preliminary 
hearing when the waivers were entered. 
Q Mr. Hickman also claims that you refused to file 
discovery motions which he asked you to file. Is that true? 
Well, first of all, did he ask you to file any discovery 
motions? 
A I have no recollection of being specifically 
asked to file any discovery motions. Do you want me to 
elaborate? 
Q Sure. 
A However, at the time of the preliminary hearing 
4 
7 
a 
10 
la 
la 
14 
is 
16 
l? 
18 
19 
20 
22 
when the waivers were entered and subsequently at the time 
that the pleas were taken, I Was in possession of all 
discovery materials and, because a plea agreement had been 
struck, felt no necessity to file for additional discovery 
materials. 
Q Mr. Hickman next claims that you falsified a 
plea, his plea affidavit. Let me expand on that a little 
bit so you can understand. Essentially he's claiming that 
no property was actually taken from the victim; however, on 
the plea agreement—excuse me, on the statement of defendant 
he 2ists it, lists that the property of an A. W. Kelson was 
taken. I will show you—or you have a copy already—the 
Affidavit of Defendant. 
Do you know why it states, the plea affidavit 
states that the property was taken? 
A Yes, I do. Mr. Hickman was charged with attempt-
ed criminal homicide, a first degree felony; aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony; and aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony. He was alleged in the documents to 
have been the trigger man or the person who shot Mr. Kelson 
in the stomach with a 12-qauqe shotgun. Those were 
22 I extremely serious charges and were apparently substantiated 
23 through the statements of at least two police informants, 
24 Mr. Memmott, Troy Memmott and Kay Lynn Neve I believe is the 
25 other person's name. 
8 
1 I When the offer was made to allow Mr. Hickman to 
2 I enter a plea of guilty to aggravated robbery, that seemed 
3 J certainly to be in his best interest, particularly when we 
4 were able to get a concession from the state that there 
5 would be no firearm enhancement, which in fact is the way it 
6 was. Aggravated robbery in my legal opinion carried less of 
7 a stigma than did aggravated kidnapping and/or attempted 
8 criminal homicide. 
9 The elements of aggravated robbery are stated 
10 over in the elements portion of the affidavit. The facts 
11 which support such an allegation—and you have to understand 
12 that aggravated robbery is a bit of a hybrid category; it 
13 does not require the actual taking of property to 
14 substantiate a claim of aggravated robbery. Based upon the 
15 evidence before us, it appeared clear that the aggravated 
16 robbery or the taking of property or the attempt to take 
17 property from the Kelsons occurred with an intent to 
18 actually take the property. 
19 This was clearly the lesser of the three very 
20 serious charges against him, and so I stated those facts in 
21 terms of what satisfied the aggravated robbery charge, and 
22 they agreed to that. And that was explained to Mr. Hickman 
23 I as is evidenced by his signature on the affidavit. 
24 Q Mr. Hickman next claims that you told him you 
25 would appear before the Board of Pardons and guarantee that 
1 } he would only spend five years in prison. Did you ever tell 
2 him that? 
3 A Ifm certain that I told him that I would appear 
4 with him at the Board of Pardons because it is my practice 
5 to offer that help to my clients. Ifve looked through the 
6 file and through messages and have no information or 
7 recollection of ever being contacted about when a board 
8 meeting would be, and therefore I did not appear. 
9 With regard to a guarantee that he would only do 
10 five years, that did not occur% I do not have the authority 
11 ] to make such guarantees, and would not ever make that type 
12 of guarantee. 
13 Q Mr. Hickmanfs final claim is that you failed to 
14 appeal on his behalf. Did he ever ask you to appeal? 
15 A No. What he—when entering his plea he waives 
16 his right to appeal. So no, I did not pursue an appeal. 
17 Q Do you recall any response you may have made to 
18 him regarding an appeal? I111 show you what Ifve marked as 
19 Defendants Exhibit A, which I would have introduced at the 
20 hearing and I probably still will. Do you recognize that? 
21 A I do. 
22 Q How do you recognize that? 
23 A It'sa letter that I sent to Mr. Hickman in 
24 January of 1988 discussing with him what could be provided 
25 in terms of habeas corpus relief. Under the contract with 
10 
1 the legal defender office we have no authority, in fact are 
2 prohibited from representing clients beyond the pendency of 
3 right of first appeal. And since there had been a waiver of 
4 that right through the plea, I was not in a position to 
5 represent him in any habeas matters, and that's what I 
6 believe I indicated in that letter of January looks like 
7 13th, 1988. 
8 MS. MICKLOS: Well, I believe those are all the 
9 claims that have been outlined in the petition. I believe 
10 thatfs all I have. 
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
12 MS. ALCABES: We donft have any questions. 
13 (Deposition was concluded at 12:20 p.m.) 
14 * * * 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of Brooke 
C. Wells, the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was 
taken before me, Vicky McDaniel, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
residing in Salt Lake County. 
That the said witness was by me, before 
examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witness was reported by 
me in Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true, and 
correct transcription of said testimony so taken and 
transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered 
from 3 to 10, inclusive, and said witness deposed and said 
as in the foregoing annexed deposition. 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said cause 
of action and that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 16th day of June, 1993. 
CK^  
idim. fti1 
My commission expires: 
December 19, 1994 
VI Y McBANIEL, CSR, RPR, CM 
Utah Li</ejise No. 285 
Notary Pubflo • 
D079SO. McN-* —»_| 100  L..
 f . South Jordan. I * 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
F. JOHN HILL 
Oirector 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Chairman 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Ex-OtfidO 
LIONEL FRANKEL 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
IRENE NIELSEN 
RAY GROUSSMAN 
STEWART HANSON. Jr. 
LON HINDE 
JAY LOWE 
JOHN O'CONNELL 
JOSEPH A. GETER 
333 SOUTH SECOND EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
532-5444 
Felony-Misdemeanor Divisions 
January 13, 1988 
Mr. Dean Hickman 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Hickman: 
I hope you have received the copy of the Affidavit 
which was mailed to you last month. 
It appears that you are interested in pursuing some 
sort of Habeas Corpus relief attacking the sentence you 
received as being excessive or illegal. We do not, as a 
general rule, order transcripts of sentencing proceedings 
since we are not obligated, by contract, to pursue any legal 
action on your behalf once a plea has been entered. This is 
because you have, as your Affidavit states, given up the 
right to pursue any appeal in the Utah state Courts. 
Therefore, the remedy available to you is through collateral 
attack. We do not handle those matters. Therefore, you 
should contact the law firm of McCullough, Jones, Jensen & 
Ivins who has a contract with the Utah State Prison to 
represent clients similarly situated. They can, if that 
Habeas Corpus action is filed, make the proper request of the 
court that a transcription be provided. 
I'm sorry I will not be able \o help you further. 
Sincerely, 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney at Law 
bp 
DEFENDANTS! 
rEXHIBIT^fe| 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
F JOHN HILL 
Otrector 
BOARO OF TRUSTEES 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Chairman 
0 . GILBERT ATHAY 
E*0ffiCJ0 
LIONEL FRANKEL 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
IRENE NIELSEN 
RAY GROUSSMAN 
STEWART HANSON, Jr. 
LON HINOE 
JAY LOWE 
JOHN O'CONNELL 
JOSEPH A. GETER 
333 SOUTH SECOND EAST 
SAU LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
532-5444 
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Mr* Dean Hickman 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Hickman: 
I hope you have received the copy of the Affidavit 
which was mailed to you last month. 
It appears that you are interested in pursuing some 
sort of Habeas Corpus relief attacking the sentence you 
received as being excessive or illegal. We do not, as a 
general rule, order transcripts of sentencing proceedings 
since we are not obligated, by contract, to pursue any legal 
action on your behalf once a plea has been entered. This is 
because you have, as your Affidavit states, given up the 
right to pursue any appeal in the Utah state Courts. 
Therefore, the remedy available to you is through collateral 
attack. We do not handle those matters. Therefore, you 
should contact the law firm of McCullough, Jones, Jensen & 
Ivins who has a contract with the Utah State Prison to 
represent clients similarly situated. They can, if that 
Habeas Corpus action is filed, make the proper request of the 
court that a transcription be provided. 
I'm sorry I will not be able \o help you further. 
Sincerely, 
BpOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney at Law 
bp I DEFENDANTS! EXHIBIT ^ \ 
ADDENDUM G 
Transcript of Post-Conviction Evidentiary Ruling 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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COPY 
Case No. 920902029 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th, 1993, 
at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause cane on for hearing 
before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, District Court, 
without a jury in the Salt Lake County Courthouse, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
17 A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiffs: ANDREA C. ALCABES 
Attorney at Law 
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Attorney at Law 
23 CAT by: 
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2 THE COURT: It's striking to the Court 
3 that the Petitioners, according to Dean(s testimony, 
4 met for an hour and a half* The positive details the 
5 Court has before it leave a lot to be desired. 
€ The Court has no substantial doubt, 
7 based upon Mr. Garcia's testimony, that Officer Bell 
8 came in at least in the latt^ ey pjxt of the meeting 
9 that was going on. And the Court recognizes that the 
10 plea negotiations were taking place very early on. I 
11 don't think I can remember a file that gets to this 
12 level of court, where the Legal Defenders' Office is 
13 involved and files a formal written appearance, that 
14 the discovery request is not in the file. It is just 
15 a routine practice of that office. They weren't at 
16 this level at the time they entertained the plea 
17 negotiations. 
18 The Court has no doubt from all of the 
19 evidence that Ms. Wells did have in her possession 
20 some discovery materials. There's no doubt to the 
21 Court that at least she, in a conclusory sort of way, 
22 advised the Defendants that there was substantial 
23 evidence against them. It's clear from this evidence 
24 that one of the witnesses against them, or two of the 
25 potential witnesses against them, were 
2 
1 co-conspirators* And although that's a substantial 
2 basis for attacking credibility at trial, the 
3 Defendants had a pending order to show cause 
4 proceeding pending before Judge Banks, For them to be 
5 talking about the potentiality of a habitual criminal 
6 charge against them, they had to have at least a one 
7 --a second degree felony conviction, with the 
8 potential of being convicted on at least a second 
9 degree felony in the case before the Court; and the 
10 the pending potential of other charges being made 
11 against them. 
12 The case concerning the voluntariness of 
13 the plea agreement was considered before Daniels. It 
14 was appealed. And, certainly, they knew at that point 
15 whether they were intimidated or threatened and 
16 coerced to enter the plea which was considered by 
17 Judge Daniels and was considered by the Dtah Supreme 
18 Court on appeal. They had an obligation to timely 
19 raise that, and they failed to do so. 
20 The Court simply is not persuaded from 
21 the record before it, given that context, that the 
22 errors of counsel -- and the Court does feel that it's 
23 clear from the record that the physical discovery 
24 materials that Brooke Wells had were not shared. It's 
25 clear to the Court that, other than in a conclusory 
3 
1 way, she didn't discuss those apparently with great 
2 specificity. However, there's been no showing in this 
3 hearing as to -- assuming the truth of all of the 
4 allegations of the defectiveness of representation of 
5 counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel, that 
6 they would have insisted on going to trial having once 
7 been bound over to the District Court. 
8 And the Court finds and concludes the 
9 second prong of the Hi-li and Stri-cki-an-d cases have not 
10 been net; accordingly, the Petition is denied. 
11 We will be in recess. 
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6 J, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify that 
7 I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary 
8 Public in and for the State of Utah? 
9 ?hat I took down the proceedings aforesaid at 
10 the time and place therein named and thereafter 
11 reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided 
12 transcription (CAT) under my direction and control; 
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